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Introduction 
One of the main arguments behind the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the 
implementation of the euro was that it would increase trade. With the same currency it 
was argued that the transaction costs of trading would decrease and thus lead to increased 
trade among the countries adopting the euro. Quite a few studies have tried to assess the 
trade effects of the euro, and most tend to find statistically significant positive effects. 
With the ongoing economic crisis in Europe and the Eurozone (EZ) together with the 
questioning of the euro’s survival, one cannot help to wonder if these unambiguously 
positive effects may differ among the respective Member States. On the one hand we 
have Members like Greece, on the verge of bankruptcy, and on the other Members like 
Germany fighting with all means for the survival of the euro. Is it not possible that the 
euro has had different effects for these two countries? Why is Germany so keen on 
keeping the euro alive? Previous research has been focusing on the overall effect of a 
common currency in general and the euro in particular. Only one study has been 
conducted on the individual Member State effects of the euro, and it was published in 
2006. Since then five new Member States have joined the EZ and adopted the euro as 
their currency. The new members consist of the former Eastern block states Estonia, 
Slovakia and Slovenia, as well as the small Mediterranean islands of Malta and Cyprus. I 
think that with the passing of time and new members joining the EZ there are new 
insights to be learned. I believe the time is high to assess these effects and to raise 
question about the success of the euro in order to make well-informed decisions about its 
future.  
 
The purpose of this paper is divided into two parts.  
1. To re-assess the overall trade effects of the euro with a larger sample group and 
a greater time span than previous research.  
2. To assess whether the trade effect varies among Member States and compare 
these effects across countries.  
 
I expect the trade effect to be overall positive for the EZ as a whole in accordance with 
both theory and previous research. However, on specific Member State level it is more 
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difficult to draw any conclusions hence I will leave this as an empirical question and let 
the results lead the discussion.  
 
To examine the effects of the euro I will use a gravity model with the addition of an euro 
dummy. With this model I will be able to isolate the effect of the euro and control for 
other trade affecting variables such as GDP, population size, and distance. The gravity 
model creates a counterfactual outcome of what would have been without the 
introduction of the euro. Thus, the model gives an indication of what would have been, 
which is used to estimate the effect the euro has had compared to a situation where it 
does not exist.  
 
The EZ sample consists of the 17 countries that have adopted the euro as their national 
currency, excluding Belgium and Luxembourg1 making a total of 15 countries in the EZ 
sample. The total sample group consists of the EU-27 again excluding Belgium and 
Luxembourg, making a total of 25 countries in the total sample group. The reason for the 
EU-27 is to control for any effects due to political economy, which would have great 
influence on trade.  
   
The paper is organized as follows. Firstly a short background of the EMU, followed by a 
theory presentation, previous research in this field, my empirical strategy along with a 
presentation of my model and the data used, my empirical results, and lastly, a summary 
along with conclusions.   
2 .  A Brief Background of the EMU  
The idea of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been a part of the EU for a 
long time. It dates back to 1969 when the European Commission set out the need for 
“greater co-ordination of economic policies and monetary cooperation” (Barre Report, 
1969) as well as the decision made by the Heads of State or Government in 1969 to come 
up with a plan to create an Economic and Monetary Union. In 1970 a blue print for an 
Economic and Monetary Union was published, called the Werner Plan, aimed at 
                                                
1 The reason for excluding Belgium and Luxembourg is the ambiguity in the data over these countries. Up 
til 1999 they were counted as one economic area, and available data has no consensus in the presentation of 
these countries after 1999. To avoid complications in my study I have chosen to exclude these two instead. 
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establishing an EMU before 1980. The ultimate goal for the Werner Plan was to “achieve 
full liberalisation of capital movements, the total convertibility of Member States’ 
currencies and the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates” (European Commission, 2011). 
Due to the international crisis caused by the change of the USD into a floating currency 
as well as the rising oil prices, the Werner Plan and the EMU were never implemented, 
but the wheels were set in motion. 
 
In March 1979, another step in the direction towards a single currency was taken. Efforts 
were made to decrease the  volatility of the members’ exchange rates and increase 
monetary stability within the EU. The European Monetary System (EMS) was introduced 
as a result of this. The EMS referred to the concept of fixing all national exchange rates, 
while leaving some room for adjustments. The exchange rates were all fixed to a weighted 
average of all the participating nations currencies. The “average exchange rate” was called 
the European Currency Unit (ECU). The participating countries were allowed to have 
their own national currency vary ±2.25 % from the ECU (although Italy was allowed a 
more generous allowance of variation). The EMS did make a lot of progress for the 
convergence of the European economies and to achieve and maintain exchange rate 
stability.  
 
The introduction of the Single Market in 1985 brought the EU members even closer. 
Despite all that had already been done, the presence of transaction costs in intra-EU trade 
still persisted and it was realized that all benefits of the Single Market would not fully be 
exploited as long as these costs still existed. To be able to fully take advantage and utilize 
all benefits from the internal market, a single currency was viewed upon as a necessity.  
 
The first stage of the EMU as we know it today started 1st of July 1990 with the free 
movement of capital coming into force. This was seen as a logical first step towards a 
common currency. The preparations for the single currency began with the meeting of 
the Council of Economic and Finance Minsters in July 1990 where the Monetary 
Committee presented a report recommending a single monetary policy and a single 
currency. 11 Member States, with only the UK opposing, supported the 
recommendation. It did not however come into force until November 1993 when the 
Treaty of Maastricht was finalized. The Maastricht Treaty formalized the Maastricht 
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convergence criteria2. These criteria were designed to guarantee that the Member States 
economies where to be ready and suitable for adopting the Single currency, and were to 
be implemented during stage two. With the finalization of the Maastricht Treaty the 
“Member States confirmed their political will to realize an Economic and Monetary 
Union” (European Commission, 2011) and it marks the ending of stage one.  
 
The second stage of the EMU stretches from 1st of January 1994 to 31st of December 
1998. During this period Member States were required to fulfil the Maastricht 
convergence criteria. This meant converge their economic and monetary policies to 
ensure economic stability of prices and public finances. The European Monetary Institute 
(EMI) was founded in 1994 and its purpose was to coordinate the convergence in 
monetary policy among the Member States’ national banks. In May 1998, 11 Member 
States met the convergence criteria. In June 1998, the European Central Bank (ECB) and 
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) replaced the EMI.  
 
The third and final stage of creating the EMU started the 1st of January 1999 with the 
irrevocable fixing of the Member States’ national exchange rates and the introduction of 
the single currency, the euro. The euro was initially only used on foreign-exchange 
markets and for electronic payment usage till the 1st of January 2002, when the first euro 
notes and coins started replacing all national currencies in the Member States. Within two 
months after the implementation of euro coins and notes, by the end of February 2002, 
all national currencies of the new EZ ceased to be a legal mean of payment. Those that 
adopted the single currency in 1999 were Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. They were later on 
followed by Greece in 2001, Slovenia in 2007, Cyprus and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 
2009, and finally Estonia in 2011, ultimately making up the EZ-17 we see today. The 
third stage has theoretically not ended yet, and will not end until all EU Member States 
                                                
2 The Convergence criteria are (1) Price Stability; “the inflation rate of a given Member State must not 
exceed by more than 1½ percentage points that of the three best-performing Member States in terms of 
price stability during the year preceding the examination of the situation in that Member State”, (2) 
Government Finances; annual government deficit to GDP must not exceed 3% and government debt to 
GDP must not exceed 60%, (3) Exchange Rates; must be a member of the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) for a minimum of 2 years, (4) Long-Term Interest Rates; “the nominal long-term 
interest rate must not exceed by more than 2 percentage points that of, at most, the three best-performing 
Member States in terms of price stability” (European Commission, 2011). 
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have adopted the euro. Two nations have exemptions to this, the UK and Denmark. The 
other eight remaining EU members, that do not have the euro, yet have convergence 
criteria to fulfil before being allowed to join the EZ. The special case of Sweden is worth 
noting as well. In 2003 Sweden had a referendum whether to adopt the euro or not, 
resulting in the people wanting to keep the Swedish Krona. Sweden was then denied an 
opt-out like the ones for the UK and Denmark. In order to stay outside the EZ and keep 
the Swedish Krona, Sweden left the ERM. By being outside the ERM, Sweden fails to 
meet the convergence criteria of being an ERM member for a minimum of 2 years and is 
therefore not eligible for adopting the euro and may keep its own currency without 
breaking any of the EU rules.  
 
Table 1 presents a summary of the EMU history and the most important years.   
 
 
 
Table 1.  EMU History 
Year Happening 
1969 Barre Report, Commission sets a need for greater co-ordination 
1970 Werner Plan 
1979 European Monetary System 
1985 Single Market  
1990 Start of stage 1 
 Free movement of capital 
1993 Maastricht Treaty 
 End of stage 1 
1994 Start of stage 2 
 European Monetary Institute  
1998 11 Member States meet the Convergence Criteria 
 European Central Bank and European System of Central Banks replaces the EMI 
 End of stage 2 
1999 Start of stage 3 
 Euro introduction in 11 Member States 
2001 Greece joins 
2002 Euro as official mean of payment 
2007 Slovenia joins 
2008 Cyprus and Malta join 
2009 Slovakia joins 
2011 Estonia joins 
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Table 2 displays all the EU-27 Member States, when they joined the EU, and if they have 
adopted the euro, when it was introduced. 
 
Note that Belgium and Luxembourg are presented in this table but will not be part of the 
empirical sample.  
3 .  The Theory of Currency Unions 
The predominant theory of the costs and benefits associated with a currency union (CU) 
is the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) described by Mundell in 1961. In short the theory 
characterizes currency unions with microeconomic benefits and macroeconomic costs. 
The losses are mainly associated with the loss of an independent central bank and thus 
the loss of an important macroeconomic policy instrument, an instrument very much 
needed when adjusting for exogenous shocks (Ricci, 2008). The most important benefits 
Table 2:  EU Membership and Euro Introduction 
Country EU Membership Euro Introduction 
Austria 1995 1999 
Belgium Founder 1999 
Bulgaria 2007 - 
Cyprus 2004 2008 
Czech Republic 2004 - 
Denmark 1973 - 
Estonia 2004 2011 
Finland 1995 1999 
France Founder 1999 
Germany Founder 1999 
Greece 1981 2001 
Hungary 2004 - 
Ireland  1973 1999 
Italy Founder 1999 
Latvia 2004 - 
Lithuania 2004 - 
Luxembourg Founder 1999 
Malta 2004 2008 
Netherlands Founder 1999 
Poland 2004 - 
Portugal 1986 1999 
Romania 2007 - 
Slovakia 2004 2009 
Slovenia 2004 2007 
Spain 1986 1999 
Sweden 1995 - 
United Kingdom  1973 - 
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according to Mundell’s theory are “(1) the elimination of transaction costs, and (2) a 
better performance of money as a medium of exchange and as a unit of account” (ibid). 
The Commission of the European Community (1990) refers to these benefits as “the 
elimination of exchange rate related transaction costs and the suppression of exchange 
rate uncertainty”. The Commission divides these transaction costs into two sub-categories; 
(1) external or financial costs as well as (2) in-house costs.  The “external or financial” 
costs are costs associated with the cost households and firms have to pay to financial 
intermediaries when exchanging currencies. These are direct costs to both private persons 
and firms. Added to the “external or financial” costs are the costs for the banking system 
when handling multiple currencies. The “in-house” costs can be described with four 
different aspects; (1) when a firm has to handle several currencies, more personnel and 
time need to be devoted to this task; (2) firms may make financial losses due to cash being 
held longer than otherwise needed, explained as “interest costs on debit positions” 
(European Commission, 1990, pp 67); (3) multiple currencies delay the debiting and 
crediting of bank accounts; (4) opportunity costs may incur due to firms trying to avoid 
exposure of the risks associated with foreign exchange (Commission, 1990). 
 
The suppression of exchange rate uncertainty refers to the theory that risk-adverse agents 
will reduce their trade if the risk of financial losses increase due to changes in exchange 
rates (ibid). Since most trade between agents do not take part at the same time, the 
delivery and the payment are not necessarily made simultaneously, there is a risk for the 
exporter that by the time s/he receives the payment, the exchange rate has changed and 
the currency has depreciated. The same risk goes for the importer, that the exchange rate 
has change in his/hers disfavour, the goods being more expensive than when the initial 
contract was drawn. To solve for this risk, agents hedge for future exchange rate risks, 
which incurs costs for the agents. Since economic theory assumes agents to be risk-averse, 
the more uncertainty in the international market, the less international trade will take 
place.  
 
The manners in which a common currency reduces transaction costs as well as 
uncertainty and risk in the international market is easiest described by the removal of the 
border effect. The border effect can be described with two neighbouring regional areas 
that share a common border but have to different currencies (i.e. an American state with 
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USD sharing a border with a Canadian province with CAD). It is reasonable to assume 
that they do not trade as much with each other as they do within their own regional area. 
This is due to transaction costs related to cross-border trade, which constitute barriers to 
trade. If the two regions were to join the same currency union, these transaction costs 
would become zero and the cross-border trade would be able expand to the same level as 
the domestic trade. The costs of exchanging currencies will vanish. The cost inflicted on 
firms due to more personnel and time devoted to the different currencies will be 
removed (at least for firms trading within the new currency union). The commitment to 
one single currency will remove all the uncertainty characterizing international trade due 
to exchange rate fluctuations. There would no longer be a border effect inflicting on 
trade. Therefore, in theory the adoption of a single currency, should lead to increased 
trade between the two countries.  
 
Intuitively the theory is quite straightforward. When adopting the same currency as one’s 
trading partner, all risk involving exchange rate fluctuations and plausible financial losses 
due to these fluctuations, will vanish and thus the risk and uncertainty embedded in 
international trade will be heavily reduced. When the risk is reduced the trade will 
naturally increase.  
 
Furthermore, according to the Commission (1990), the countries that would gain the 
most from the adoption of the euro will be small and middle sized economies, due the 
notion that small economies generally engage in more trade relative large economies 
which are to a greater extent more self-sufficient. Therefore, opening up to the new larger 
internal market, will relatively affect the small economy to a greater extent than the large 
economy. Economies with poor financial institutions will also gain more from the euro 
due to greater reduction in the uncertainty associated with exchange rate fluctuations.  
 
Thus, the most important benefits from a currency union are the reduction of transaction 
costs, which occur due to uncertainty aspects, exchange rate fluctuations, as well as the 
direct cost inflicted on firms and households when dealing with multiple currencies. 
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4.  Previous Research  
The literature of currency union effects as it is today started with Rose (2000). After a 
long period of trying to detect the effects by measuring the volatility of exchange rates, 
Rose took the commonly known gravity model and added a dummy variable checking for 
the presence of a common currency between a country-pair. Rose started his article with a 
seemingly straightforward question, answering it with a very straightforward answer: 
 
“Question: What is the effect of a common currency on international trade?  
Answer: Large.” (Rose 2000) 
 
He estimated that a common currency would increase trade between two countries about 
three times. The unexpectedly large effect found by Rose (2000) started a lively debate 
among researchers whether effects of this magnitude are reasonable. One major concern 
with his findings was that the shared currencies in his data were mostly between poor and 
small countries (e.g. the East Caribbean dollar), or several small and poor countries 
adopting a currency of a large developed country (e.g. the islands of Kiribati, Nauru, and 
Tuvalu adopting the Australian dollar, also referred to as Dollarization). Since Rose was 
trying to estimate the effect of a currency union in general, and his sample countries were 
in many ways very different from the EZ Members, it is argued that the study is not 
suitable as an example for the EZ.    
 
Subsequent years several articles were published, all trying to estimate the “real” trade 
effect of a common currency and in particular the effects of the euro. Micco, Stein and 
Ordoñez (2003), and de Nardis and Vicarelli (2003) used a more direct approach trying 
to detect the trade effect of the euro. Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2003) asked what “is the 
impact of a currency union on those countries that adopt it”. They used a gravity model, 
but in a way that adequately controls for unobserved heterogeneity that otherwise can lead 
to biased results. They capture unobserved heterogeneity by including country pair fixed 
effects. With this methodology, they find the euro’s effect to be 4-10% on trade within the 
EZ. 
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De Nardis and Vicarelli (2003) point out that reversed causality can be a problem when 
estimating the effects of a common currency on trade. In other words, it is possible that 
countries adopt a common currency because they already trade a lot, and if that is the 
case, there is a causal link going from the dependent variable (trade flows) to the 
independent variable (common currency). Obviously, this is problematic. To remedy this 
problem, De Nardis and Vicarelli (2003) include lagged trade flows as an additional 
explanatory variable. Interestingly, this methodological innovation does not change the 
conclusion that the euro increases trade (the authors find a 10% increase in trade).  
 
Bun and Klaassen (2002) used a slightly different approach by taking export values 
instead of import values as the dependent variable but did draw the same conclusion as 
both Micco et al. and de Nardis and Vicarelli. They found that the euro increased trade 
in the first year by 4 %, and they calculated it to increase trade by 40 % in the long-run. In 
2007 Bun and Klaassen changed their opinion with a new article downsizing the euro’s 
effect to only 3 %. They found that there was an upward trend in the residuals from the 
models previously used and therefore extended the standard gravity model by including a 
time trend that may have different effects across country pairs to correct for this unwanted 
trend.  
 
In 2007, Flam and Nordström used bilateral direction-specific trade flows, namely export 
flows, unlike Micco et al. (2003) who used an average of bilateral export and import flows.    
They found a fairly high effect of 28 % (although nothing in comparison to Rose’s original 
300%) increased trade within the EZ. They found that not only had the euro had a 
positive effect on intra-EZ trade, but also had a positive effect on trade between euro 
countries and non-euro countries.  
 
A fairly large body of research has been dedicated to the overall trade effect of the euro 
but there is still a large gap in the research when assessing the individual effects. The only 
study made to this date is by Aristotelous (2006). He found the overall effect of the euro 
to be positive, just like the rest of the literature, but found that there were winners and 
losers in the game of the euro. Austria, France, and Greece were found to have 
experienced a negative and statistically significant effect from the euro. The second part of 
my study is much influenced by Aristotelous (2006). It replicates his study with a gravity 
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model but with some alterations as well as improved with a larger data set and again a 
greater time span.  
  
To summarize, the literature regarding the effects on trade of a currency union seems to 
be pointing in the same direction. Adopting one single currency will, according to 
previous research, increase trade within the currency union. The following empirical 
analysis will use new data to test this conclusion.  
5.  Empirical  Strategy 
To assess the trade effects of the euro, I will use a gravity model. The gravity model is a 
standard tool in international trade and has been used by many economists estimating 
different trade effects (i.e. Rose 2000, Micco et al. 2003, Flam and Norström 2003, 
Aristotelous 2006). Anderson and Wincoop (2003) as well as Baldwin (2006) have 
demonstrated the theoretical ground of the gravity model and argued for its proficiency. 
The model I use here is following the one used by Aristotelous (2006) with some 
alterations, i.e. Aristotelous used an EU trend, which I instead account for in year-specific 
dummies as well as the usage of country-pair specific dummies. I use year and country-
specific dummies instead. According to the gravity model, trade flow between two 
economies will be a result of different economical factors such as GDP, population size, 
and distance together with a number of dummy variables such as common language, 
common border, landlocked, members of the same PTA, common colonizer, etc.  
 
The specific baseline model I have chosen for my study is described as follows: 
 
where ln is the natural logarithm, i the importing country, j is the exporting country, t is a 
year within the time period 1995-2011. Xijt is the dependent variable, which denotes the 
value of bilateral trade in thousands of US dollar between country i and country j in 
period t (for all i ≠  j).  
 
(1) ln(Xijt) = β0 + β1ln(GDPit) + β2ln(GDPjt) + β3ln(POPit) + β4ln(POPjt) + β5ln(DISTij) +  
β6 LANGij + β7 CONTIGij + β8 EUijt + β9 EU1ijt + β10 EMUijt + µi(j) + λt+ εijt 
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The first independent variable in equation 1 is GDPit, which is the real GDP for country 
i at time t. The second independent variable is GDPjt, which is the real GDP for country j 
at time t. These two variables represent the economic size of the two countries and as 
larger economies are expected have an absolute larger trade, both coefficients are 
expected to be positive. The third and fourth independent variables are POPit and 
POPjt. These refer to the population size in the importing country i, and the population 
of the exporting country j, respectively, at time t. The larger a country’s population size, 
the less is a country expected to trade. This stems from the larger the population size at a 
constant GDP level, the smaller the per capita level of GDP, thus the less wealthy a 
country is. The coefficients of the population variables are therefore expected to be 
negative. The fifth independent variable is DISTij, which is the distance from country i’s 
economic centre to country j’s economic centre. This variable primarily captures 
transport costs. The greater the distance, the higher the transport costs, and thus the more 
expensive trade will be. Therefore, the distance between two countries is expected to 
reduce trade and accordingly the coefficient is expected to be negative.  
 
In addition to these continuous explanatory variables, the model also includes a set of 
dummy variables that capture various trade costs. The first is LANGij, which will take the 
value of 1 if country i and country j have a common (official) language, and 0 if they do 
not. A common language is viewed upon as a facilitator for trade since it will reduce 
transaction costs due to costs such as for translations, as well as uncertainties that can 
occur due to language barriers. Thus, a common language should increase trade. The 
parameter is therefore expected to have a positive sign. The second dummy variable is 
CONTIGij. It takes the value of 1 if country i and country j share a common border, and 
will otherwise take the value of 0. A common border should facilitate trade since it 
narrows down the distance and thus transport costs between the two countries, and 
consequently its sign is expected to be positive.  
 
The next dummies are designed to capture the effects of a preferential trade agreement 
(PTA) and a currency union. The first dummy EUijt, will take the value of 1 if both 
countries are members of the EU at time t, and the value of 0 otherwise. It will capture 
the effect on trade imposed by the EU. If two countries are members of the same PTA 
they are expected to trade more, thus the parameter for the EU dummy is expected to be 
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positive. The fifth dummy is EU1ijt. It will take the value of one if only one of country i 
and country j is a EU member at time t. If both or neither is a member, it will take the 
value of 0. It is plausible that when only one country is a Member of the EU it may have 
effects on trade. Important to note here is that all sample countries today are Member 
States of the EU, making the time dimension important. It captures whether or not a 
country has already joined the EU or not and its effect on trade.  
 
The variable of main interest is the EMUijt dummy. This will take the value of 1 if both 
countries have adopted the euro as their currency at time t, and the value of 0 if only one 
or none of the two have adopted the euro. For example, the EMU for Austria and Cyprus 
will take the value of 0 for all t between 1995-2003. For all t between 2004-2011, the 
EMU for Austria and Cyprus will take the value of 1 since Cyprus adopted the euro in 
2004. This is the most important parameter in the first part of the analysis, as it will 
determine the overall trade effect of the euro. It is expected to be positive since, as stated 
in the theory section, a common currency will decrease transaction costs and reduce 
uncertainty and thus increase trade flows, ceteris paribus.  
 
I also include a set of fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. µi(j) represent 
country-specific effects for all countries (disregarding whether the country is an importer 
or an exporter).  These country-specific effects capture all country-specific features that 
are not controlled for by the included explanatory variables but nevertheless affect the 
trade levels for the specific country. For example, one country may have a significantly 
higher level of trade facilitation than others and may therefore be a more sought after 
trading partner due to lower transaction costs. I also include a set of time-fixed effects, λt, 
which captures unobserved heterogeneity that varies over time but is constant for all 
trading countries. For instance, one would expect trade in 2008 to be less for all countries 
due to the financial crisis. By including time-fixed effects, this decline in trade will be 
accounted for and not falsely thought of as an effect of the euro. Lastly, the model 
includes and error term, εijt.  
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The second part of my analysis is dedicated to the individual Member States’ effects. 
Equation 2 is based on the model used by Aristotelous (2006), and is intended to account 
for these individual effects and is designed as follows: 
 
The equation is identical with equation 1 except in the sense that the overall euro dummy 
EMUijt has been replaced by 15 dummy variables that each represents one of the EZ 
members (Belgium and Luxembourg excluded for previously stated reasons). These will 
take the value of 1 if both countries in a trading country-pair have adopted the euro at the 
time t, regardless which is the importer and which is the exporter. Otherwise it will take 
the value of 0. The index of (i/j) indicates that the variable represents the Member State 
both as an important and as an exporter. For example, the EMU-AUTt will take the value 
of 1 if, and only if, the trading partner has adopted the euro at the same time t as Austria. 
Take Austria and Slovenia, the dummy will take the value of 0 for all t between 1995-
2006, and the value of 1 for all t between 2006-2011. Austria adopted the euro in 1999, 
but since Slovenia did not adopt it until 2007, the dummy will only take the value of 1 
from 2007 and onwards. The parameters of the specific EZ members’ dummies will 
capture the effect of the euro on each individual member, relative all other members. 
These will be the main focus in the second part of the analysis, where these individual 
trade effects will be discussed.  
 
The model will be estimated with a least-square regression using heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors. The usage of robust standard errors is consistent with praxis 
within the empirical gravity literature. Usually a correction for zero trade values is needed 
but due to the specific sample of only EU Member States where trade exists between all 
(2) ln(Xijt) = β0 + β1ln(GDPit) + β2ln(GDPjt) + β3ln(POPit) + β4ln(POPjt) + β5ln(DISTij) +  
β6 LANGij + β7 CONTIGij + β8 EUijt + β9 EU1ijt + γ1 EMU-AUT(i/j)t +  
γ2  EMU-CYP(i/j)t + γ3 EMU-DEU(i/j)t + γ4 EMU-ESP(i/j)t + γ5 EMU-EST(i/j)t +  
γ6 EMU-FIN(i/j)t + γ7 EMU-FRA(i/j)t + γ8 EMU-GRC(i/j)t + γ9 EMU-IRL(i/j)t +  
γ10 EMU-ITA(i/j)t + γ11 EMU-MLT(i/j)t + γ12 EMU-NLD(i/j)t + γ13 EMU-PRT(i/j)t + 
γ14 EMU-SVK(i/j)t + γ15 EMU-SVN(i/j)t + µi(j) + λt + εijt  
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country-pairs, there are no zero trade values and this does not need to be corrected for. 
For information about data sources see the Appendix3.  
6 .  Empirical  Results  
The empirical results are divided up into two parts, the first one being the baseline 
regression and the second part being robustness analyses.  
6.1 Baseline Results 
In accordance with the two main aspects of this study I have divided the baseline results 
into two parts, the first presenting the result of the overall trade effect of the euro, and the 
second presenting the result for the individual effects.  
6.1.1 Trade Effects of the Euro 
The result from the baseline regression of equation 1 is presented in table 3. 
 
Table 3.  Baseline Regression Equation 1 
Country/Variable Equation 1 
ln GDPi 0,833 (0,000)*** 
ln GDPj 1,032 (0,000)*** 
ln Populationi -1,660 (0,000)*** 
ln Populationj -1,786 (0,000)*** 
ln Distance -1,302 (0,000)*** 
  
Common Language 0,722 (0,000)*** 
Contiguity  0,371 (0,000)*** 
EU 0,666 (0,000)*** 
EU1 0,368 (0,000)*** 
EMU 0,079 (0,006)*** 
  
Country Specific Effect Yes 
Year Specific Effect Yes 
  
R-squared  0,91 
Observations 9864 
Source: Author's econometric results  
Notes: White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors have been used. P-values are reported in parenthesis; ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
                                                
3 There are missing values for Ireland’s GDP level during 1995-1999, Spain’s import level in 2011, 
Bulgaria’s import level in 1995, and Slovakia’s import level during 1995-1996.  
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Starting with the control variables, their coefficients all have the expected sign. The GDP 
level of both the importing and the exporting country give positive effects on trade, 
implying the greater the economic size, the greater the trading flows will be. The 
population variables have negative signs reflecting that trade is declining with increasing 
populations due to a fall in per capita GDP levels. The distance variable too has a 
negative sign, which is expected due to the greater the distance, the higher the transport 
costs, and thus the lower the trade. They are all statistically significant at a 1% level and in 
accordance with what previous research have presented.  
 
The standard gravity model dummies of Common Language and Contiguity both have 
the expected signs. The coefficients of the two are positive reflecting that a shared 
common language and/or a shared border will increase trade between a country-pair. 
Both the EU and the EU1 has positive signs meaning that if both countries are EU 
Member States it will increase trade, as well as when only one of the two is a member. 
This means that the EU makes overall trade easier, both for intra-EU4 trade as well as for 
extra-EU trade5. All dummy variables are statistically significant at a 1% level.  
 
It should be noted that country-specific as well as year-specific dummies were included in 
the model but are not presented in the table due to the little importance they individually 
bring to the analysis.  
 
The key variable in equation 1 is the EMUijt, reflecting the overall effect on trade within 
the EZ. The variable is both positive and statistically significant (at 1% level) as expected. 
The EMU coefficient of 0.079 reflects an 8.2%6 impact on trade. This means that the 
overall trade effect of the euro on the EZ’s intra-trade is 8.2%. This is consistent with the 
expectations that a common currency should increase intra-CU trade and the result of 
8.2% is consistent with the results from previous research, i.e. Micco et al. (2003) 
estimated 4-10% and de Nardis and Vicarelli (2003) estimated a 10% effect on trade.  
                                                
4 Intra-EU trade refers to trade within the EU. 
5 Extra-EU trade refers to when a Member State is trading with a non-Member State. 
6 Formula for interpreting dummy coefficients: Gross Trade Creation (GTC) = 100(eβ – 1) where β is the 
dummy coefficient.  
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6.1.2 Trade Effects for Individual Euro Countries 
The second focus of this study is the estimation of individual euro trade effects. Thus the 
key variable in equation 2 is the EMU(i/j)t, which accounts for these individual effects. 
The results are presented in table 4.  
 
Table 4.  Baseline Regression Equation 2 
Country/Variable Equation 2 
ln GDPi 0,757 (0,000)*** 
ln GDPj 0,956 (0,000)*** 
ln Populationi -2,117 (0,000)*** 
ln Populationj -2,242 (0,000)*** 
ln Distance -1,318 (0,000)*** 
   
Common Language 0,731 (0,000)*** 
Contiguity  0,377 (0,000)*** 
EU 0,656 (0,000)*** 
EU1 0,362 (0,000)*** 
  
EMU Austria 0,137 (0,002)*** 
EMU Cyprus 0,359 (0,007)*** 
EMU Estonia -0,321 (0,031)*** 
EMU Finland 0,295 (0,000)*** 
EMU France -0,201 (0,000)*** 
EMU Germany -0,396 (0,000)*** 
EMU Greece 0,293 (0,000)*** 
EMU Ireland 0,026 (0,673)*** 
EMU Italy 0,068 (0,079)*** 
EMU Malta 0,458 (0,000)*** 
EMU Netherlands -0,231 (0,000)*** 
EMU Portugal 0,279 (0,000)*** 
EMU Slovakia -0,187 (0,066)*** 
EMU Slovenia -0,229 (0,001)*** 
EMU Spain 0,122 (0,003)*** 
  
Country Specific Effect Yes 
Year Specific Effect Yes 
  
R-squared  0,911 
Observations 9864 
Source: Author's econometric results 
Notes: White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors have been used. P-values are reported in parenthesis; ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The gravity model variables and dummies all have the expected sign and are of similar 
magnitude as in the results of equation 1.  
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All EZ-specific coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level except Ireland (not 
statistically significant at any level), Italy (only statistically significant at the 10% level), and 
Slovakia (only statistically significant at the 10% level). The notion of Ireland not being 
statistically significant can be a result from the lack of observations. As stated in the 
previous section, there were no records to be found on Irelands GDP level for 1995-
1999, and this may be causing the insignificancy.    
 
Starting with the absolute trade effects from equation 2, both negative and positive effects 
are present. Malta and Cyprus have had the two largest trade effects, in absolute terms 
58.1% and 43.2% respectively. The countries that have had the lowest trade effects are 
Germany, with a trade effect of -32.7%, and Estonia, with an effect on trade of -27.5%. 
These negative trade effects are in theory very unexpected to find since theory clearly 
states that a common currency should increase trade. These results indicate that some of 
the EZ Member States actually have experienced lower trade flows than the reference 
trade in a situation without the euro. However, when the model allows the EMU 
parameter to vary for a large number of countries, the reference trade against which one 
compares the effect is less well-defined. This meaning there is a degree of ambiguity in 
how to interpret these estimates. In order to not make any assumptions without 
verifications I will not focus on the precise magnitude of each estimated coefficient, but 
instead use the coefficients as a way to assess the relative ranking of these individual 
effects. Thus the sign of the estimate is of less importance, the main aspect is how they 
relate to each other.    
 
Regardless of interpreting the results as absolute or as a ranking list, the results from 
equation 2 imply that Malta and Cyprus are the two economies that have reaped the most 
benefits from joining the EMU and adopting the euro, whilst Germany and Estonia have 
gained the least from the euro.  
 
It is important to try to identify why these effects differ across countries. I will discuss 
plausible explanations for why I believe these countries are the greatest winners and 
losers, respectively.  
 
 19 
According to theory small and middle-sized countries should gain the most from adopting 
the euro due to greater relative propensity to trade. However, the effect of the economies 
size is already accounted for in the GDP variable. Thus to explain why these small 
economies, Malta and Cyprus, are the ranked the highest, we have to look at other 
aspects characterizing small economies, which the GDP variable does not capture. 
Plausible explanations could be that small countries may tend to have less well-developed 
financial institutions as larger ones. This aspect would make it more beneficial for the 
small economy to join the EZ and thus get a more credible and stabile currency, which 
would increase trade.  
 
The lowest ranking country, Germany, stands in great contrast to Malta and Cyprus, being 
one of the utmost trading nations in the EU. To evaluate why Germany ends up as the 
lowest ranked Member, I believe history to have had great influence.  Post World War 
II, Germany has been an eminent trading nation and a major player in the global trading 
market, and the D-mark was one of the most stabile currencies in the 1990’s. These 
historical attributes of the German economy leads to the conclusion that the German 
economy was already trading to a very high extent, that the extra trade benefits created by 
the euro, did not add all that much. Compared with other EZ Members, Germany may 
not need the euro as badly to keep high trade flows, and thus being ranked as the country 
benefiting the least from the euro introduction.  
 
The second lowest ranked country, Estonia, adopted the euro very recently, as late as in 
Estonia in 2011. It is plausible to suspect that the very short trade records of the euro are 
not enough to actually find the increasing trade flows for Estonia. It is reasonable that it 
might take a few years for the euro to affect a country’s trade flow enough to create large 
positive flows.  
 
6.2 Robustness Results 
To test the robustness of my model I have performed two types of robustness analyses, 
testing for the most common errors discussed in previous research. Firstly by changing 
the start-year of the euro, and secondly by testing for a reversed causality.  
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6.2.1 Robustness with Different Start -Year 
The results from the first robustness analysis, equation 1 and 2, are presented in table 5.  
 
Table 5.  Robustness Regressions 
Country/Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 
ln GDPi 0,834 (0,000)*** 0,757 (0,000)*** 
ln GDPj 1,034 (0,000)*** 0,956 (0,000)*** 
ln Populationi -1,667 (0,000)*** -2,117 (0,000)*** 
ln Populationj -1,793 (0,000)*** -2,242 (0,000)*** 
ln Distance -1,302 (0,000)*** -1,318 (0,000)*** 
    
Common Language 0,722 (0,000)***  0,731 (0,000)*** 
Contiguity  0,371 (0,000)*** 0,377 (0,000)*** 
EU 0,659 (0,000)*** 0,656 (0,000)*** 
EU1 0,366 (0,000)*** 0,362 (0,000)*** 
EMU 0,077 (0,006)***  
   
EMU Austria  0,137 (0,002)*** 
EMU Cyprus  0,359 (0,007)*** 
EMU Estonia  -0,321 (0,031)*** 
EMU Finland  0,295 (0,000)*** 
EMU France  -0,201 (0,000)*** 
EMU Germany  -0,396 (0,000)*** 
EMU Greece  0,293 (0,000)*** 
EMU Ireland  0,026 (0,673)*** 
EMU Italy  0,068 (0,079)*** 
EMU Malta  0,458 (0,000)*** 
EMU Netherlands  -0,231 (0,000)*** 
EMU Portugal  0,279 (0,000)*** 
EMU Slovakia  -0,187 (0,066)*** 
EMU Slovenia  -0,229 (0,001)*** 
EMU Spain  0,122 (0,003)*** 
   
Country Specific Effect Yes Yes 
Year Specific Effect Yes Yes 
   
R-squared  0,910 0,911 
Observations 9864 9864 
Source: Author's econometric results 
Notes: White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors have been used. P-values are reported in parenthesis; ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. The start-year of the euro has been moved to a year prior to the 
official year of joining the EZ.  
 
As argued by Micco et al. (2003), the actual decision about joining the final stage of the 
EMU did not happen over night. It is within reason to assume that one year prior to the 
actual adoption, the economy started reaping benefits from the euro. Micco et al. (2003) 
used a sample only consisting of economies joining in 1999 plus Greece, and thus they 
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used 1998 as an overall start-year and 2000 for Greece. In table 5 the start-year has been 
moved to one year earlier for each and all Members, leading to 1998 for all that adopted 
in 1999, 2000 for Greece, 2006 for Slovenia, 2007 for Malta and Cyprus, 2008 for 
Slovakia, and 2010 for Estonia. If the results would change notably, it would indicate that 
the effects of the euro in table 3 and 4 might not be reliable.  
 
All gravity model variables are slightly changing but well within reason for the robustness 
to hold. The important variable is the EMU which here takes the value of 0.077 
indicating a percentage change of 8.00%. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 
1% level and the minor difference of 0.2% is not enough to question the results in Table 
3. Thus, the robustness test indicates accuracy of the baseline model.  
 
The individual effects all have the same coefficients at the same significance level as in 
Table 4, which again confirms the robustness of the model.  
 
6.2.2 Reversed Causali ty Regression 
The second robustness analysis performed is in accordance with de Nardis and Vicarelli’s 
study in 2003. They checked for reversed causality by adding an extra independent 
variable in the model. They included lagged import flows, testing for up to three years lag. 
I performed a test with a similar addition, but with the limitation of only one lagged 
period. The ln Import Flow (lagged) is the import flow variable lagged one period, thus, 
the import flow of i.e. 2005 is added as an independent variable describing the import 
flow of 2006. By doing this, one is trying to capture the effect of history. The lagged 
variable is supposed to capture the effect on this year’s trade due to the trade flow during 
the year before. This reversed causality test is designed to estimate if large trade flows is 
what fosters a currency union and not the other way around, that the currency union is 
the cause of the large trade flows. 
 
The results from this regression are presented in table 6.  
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- 
The key variable in this regression is once again the EMU. Here, although it is negative it 
is also statistically insignificant. The notion of the EMU variable being statistically 
insignificant is interesting on its own. It implies that when accounting for historical trade 
flows, the euro may actually not have an effect on trade at all. This may certainly be of 
great importance when deciding on the euro’s future. Since it implies that the positive 
effects that have been argued for may not actually be an effect of the euro, but rather that 
countries have joined the euro because they trade a lot with other euro countries, and 
thus the euro itself would be superfluous when it comes to its effect on trade.  
 
As a side note to the last robustness test, logistic and probit regressions were made with 
the EMU dummy as the dependent variable. These results are presented in table 7.  
 
Table 6. Reversed Causality Regression 
Country/Variable Reversed Causality 
ln Import Flow (lagged) 0,537 (0,000)*** 
ln GDPi 0,756 (0,000)*** 
ln GDPj 0,873 (0,000)*** 
ln Populationi -0,902 (0,000)*** 
ln Populationj -0,969 (0,000)*** 
ln Distance -0,637 (0,000)*** 
   
Common Language 0,335 (0,000)*** 
Contiguity  0,185 (0,000)*** 
EU 0,332 (0,000)*** 
EU1 0,191 (0,000)*** 
EMU -0,022 (0,241)*** 
  
Country Specific Effect Yes 
Year Specific Effect Yes 
  
R-squared  0,91 
Observations 9793 
Source: Author's econometric results 
Notes: White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors have been used. P-values are reported in parenthesis; ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. A one-year lag of the import flow is added as an independent 
variable to check for reversed causality.  
Table 7. Probability to Join a CU   
Country/Variable Logit Probit 
ln Import Flow (lagged) 0,346 (0,000)*** 0,183 (0,000)*** 
Source: Author's econometric results 
Notes: White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors have been used. P-values are reported in parenthesis; ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. The dependent variable is set as EMUijt  
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The two regressions test for the likelihood to join a CU when increasing the import flow. 
They both showed that when increasing the bilateral trade flow between a country-pair, 
the likelihood of the two joining the same CU increases. This result indicates that 
reversed causality may indeed be a problem, and further research would be welcome to 
shed light on this issue.   
 
Taking the second part of the robustness analysis into account with the unexpected results 
of equation 2 in the baseline regression, one cannot help to question if a model without 
the historical aspect is the right way to estimate these kinds of effects. The negative aspects 
of the individual effects may be caused due to omitted variables and thus the model may 
prove to be unfit for the study. These are ones again indications that more research is 
much needed.  
7.  Summary and Conclusion  
The purpose of this paper has two parts. The first being to re-assess the overall trade 
effect of the euro with a larger data set and a greater time span compared to previous 
research. The second part being to estimate and compare individual Member State trade 
effects to conclude if one could see winners or losers when it comes to the introduction 
and adoption of the euro. This has been done with the usage of bilateral intra-EU trade 
together with a gravity model, which included an EMUijt dummy, capturing the overall 
effect in the first analysis, and country-specific EMU(i/j)t dummies, capturing the 
individual effect in the second analysis.  
 
I found the general trade effect to be positive, around 8%, in accordance with much of the 
literature today. However, when controlling for reversed causality this effect vanishes, 
implying that the euro would not have a significant effect on trade after all. This result 
should be read with caution but is still a result of great importance.  
 
My results for the individual effects indicate that Members have experienced different 
trade effects from adopting the euro. I chose to interpret the results as a ranking list, due 
to the less well-defined reference trade. This ranked Malta and Cyprus as the biggest 
winners and Germany as the biggest loser. Plausible explanation for these rankings may 
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be underdeveloped financial institutions in Malta and Cyprus, and historical relevance in 
the case of Germany. The result of Germany not being higher ranked is indeed notable 
since Germany is commonly thought of as the saviour of the euro and thus often 
expected to benefit extensively.  
 
An interesting question is why Germany is fighting for the future survival of the euro, if 
the German economy does not benefit all that much from it? There is no easy answer to 
this question. My results are not saying that Germany is not benefiting at all from the 
euro, more that the effect on trade may not be as large as first expected. Perhaps, due to 
the lack of research, the Member States’ governments may not know the real individual 
trade effects. Or maybe Germany is fighting for the euro’s survival just because of the 
simple explanation that it may be the only Member who can. Another reason may be 
pride. Germany as one of the founders of the EU and one of the advocates for the 
creation of the Single currency may be fighting for the euro’s survival for the reason of not 
admitting defeat. These are speculations at best and an exhortation to conduct more 
research in this area.  
 
The contradiction to the common view presented in these results combined with the 
reversed causality results should increase the willingness to devote more time and 
resources to learn more. It should be in every EZ Member’s government’s interest to 
know more about the individual effects and how the euro is actually affecting their 
particular country. Therefore it is perplexing why this field has been given so limited 
attention. To get greater knowledge about the individual effects and more in-depth 
reasons for what determines who benefits the most, as well as if there is an overall euro 
effect at all, much more research is needed.  
 
As to conclude this paper I would like to say that this although shallow study, has shown 
that there are, in relative terms speaking, winners and losers in the game of the euro. 
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 Appendix 
 
Variable Defini t ion  Source Reference 
ln GDPi 
The natural logarithm of the GDP level in the 
importing country for every year t, measured in US 
dollar at constant 2000 prices 
World Bank 
(2012) 
World 
Development 
Indicators  
ln GDPj 
The natural logarithm of the GDP level in the 
exporting country for every year t, measured in US 
dollar at constant 2000 prices 
World Bank 
(2012) 
World 
Development 
Indicators  
ln Populationi 
The natural logarithm of the population in the 
importing country for every year t 
World Bank 
(2012) 
World 
Development 
Indicators  
ln Populationj 
The natural logarithm of the population in the 
exporting country for every year t 
World Bank 
(2012) 
World 
Development 
Indicators  
ln Distance 
The natural logarithm of the distance between the 
economical centres in the importing and exporting 
countries 
CEPII (2012) GeoDist 
Common 
Language 
Official language CEPII (2012) GeoDist 
Contiguity  Common border CEPII (2012) GeoDist 
EU Importer and exporter EU Member States in year t EU (2012) 
Towards a Single 
Currency 
EU1 
Only one of importer and exporter EU Member 
States in year t  
EU (2012) 
Towards a Single 
Currency 
EMU Importer and exporter EZ members in year t EU (2012) 
Towards a Single 
Currency 
 
